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leads to obviously absurd consequences. These arguments which take the form of 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It may not be chic to confess to being a legal monist these days, in particular because of the 
apparently dualist state of the international legal order which lacks effective enforcement 
mechanisms1 and hence requires transposition to penetrate the national legal order in order to 
take full effect within it. 2  Furthermore legal pluralism, in contrast to monism, displays 
immensely appealing features such as ‘good, progressive, tolerant, non-domineering’ – in 
contrast to the characteristics of hierarchically ordered systems: ‘bad, regressive, intolerant, 
domineering.’3 Besides the direct and intuitive appeal of both dualism and pluralism, the main 
reason why legal monism (as envisaged by Hans Kelsen and other proponents of the Pure 
Theory of Law4) is unfashionable among legal theorists and scholars these days is that – 
according to prevailing opinion – it has decisively been refuted by two of the most eminent 
legal theorists, namely H.L.A Hart in his essay ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’5 and 
Joseph Raz, in particular in his book The Concept of a Legal System.6 In general, Hart and Raz 
also argue that laws exist as part of legal systems7 or that there is a system-constituting social 
rule, i.e. the rule of recognition, which specifies the membership conditions of legal norms.8 
Yet neither of them ever went as far as Kelsen and declared that all legal norms in the world 
necessarily formed part of a unitary legal order.9 According to their criticism, legal monism 
fails to offer a satisfactory theory of the identity of legal systems and therefore it simply cannot 
be considered a viable theory of a legal system, because it leads to obviously absurd 
                                                             
1 Stefan Griller, ‘Völkerrecht und Landesrecht – unter Berücksichtigung des Europarechts’ in Robert Walter, 
Clemens Jabloner, and Klaus Zeleny (eds), Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht (Vienna: Manz, 2004) 90-93. 
2 Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh, and Zachary Elkins, ‘Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National 
Constitutions Incorporate International Law’ (2008) 2008 University of Illinois Law Review 201, 204. 
3 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism – Some Doubts’ in Gráinne de Búrca and 
J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
14. 
4 At this point, it should be emphasized that this paper is not about Hans Kelsen alone. Most of the academic 
literature in Anglo-American legal theory seems to be focusing exclusively on him, which does not do justice to 
the other thinkers and writers of the Vienna School of Jurisprudence. Kelsen may have been the most prominent 
and well-known proponent of this particular school of legal thinking, but the most notable influences on his work 
– particularly by Adolf Julius Merkl, Alfred Verdross, and Josef L. Kunz – should not be neglected. 
5 Hart’s essay was first published in Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz (eds), Ethics and Social Justice 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968). For references to his essay in this paper, cf. the reprinted 
version: H.L.A Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’ in Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson (eds), Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (reprint; Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2007) 553-581. 
6 Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (2nd edn; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980). The first edition was published in 1970. 
7 Joseph Raz, ‘The Identity of Legal Systems’ (1971) 59 California Law Review 795-815. 
8 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 92. 
9 Michael Giudice, ‘Hart and Kelsen on International Law’ in Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (eds), Oxford Studies 
in Philosophy of Law: Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 148. 
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consequences. The membership of norms in a given legal system can only be ascertained with 
reference to the social practices of identification, which characterize the activity of the primary 
law-applying institutions of that legal system.10 
Given the impact of this criticism on the substantial value of the Pure Theory of Law as 
a theory to conceive of the law in general and on legal monism in particular, a scrutinizing 
analysis of Hart and Raz’s arguments is immensely worthwhile. These arguments, which, in 
principle, take the form of an attack on the most basic tenets of the Pure Theory of Law and 
legal monism, must be duly addressed and credibly rebutted in order to maintain monism in 
the juridico-epistemological sense as a working and viable theory of the law. This paper 
undertakes this task, firstly, with regard to the arguments voiced by H.L.A. Hart, and 
subsequently by tackling those of Joseph Raz. By doing so, it mostly builds upon the arguments 
made by Lars Vinx in two of his contributions,11 but goes beyond them in various ways.12 
Having said that, this paper should not be read as a type of ‘Wittgenstein’s poker’,13 i.e. as 
giving an answer to the question of who has won this controversy between intellectual giants. 
It should first and foremost be seen as a defence of Kelsen, Verdross, and Kunz, and their 
concept of legal monism against misinterpretation. But it is also true that this approach in itself 
is not sufficient. Most importantly, even though the mere negative rebuttal of both Hart and 
Raz’s criticism of monism and the Pure Theory of Law might be highly convincing in itself, 
this paper will also provide positive support for Kelsen’s position. This will mostly be done by 
reference to the Kantian and neo-Kantian roots of the Pure Theory of Law through which it 
becomes evident – epistemologically as well as logically – that monism remains the only choice 
if we want to consider the law as having an objective meaning for everyone.14 It is of course 
well known that Kelsen took a radical turn away from Kantianism in his General Theory of 
                                                             
10 Cf. Lars Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Legality and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) 182. 
11 Cf. in particular his analysis in Lars Vinx, ‘The Kelsen-Hart Debate: Hart’s Critique of Kelsen’s Legal Monism 
Reconsidered’ in Jeremy Telman (ed), Hans Kelsen in America – Selective Affinities and the Mysteries of 
Academic Influence (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016) X-Y, and Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (n 10) 184-
194. 
12 Especially with regard to the epistemological roots of the Pure Theory of Law; the Grundnorm of international 
law and arguments in favour of a positive constitution of the international legal order (thus also going beyond the 
arguments of Jörg Kammerhofer); and the epistemological necessity of the primacy of international law (a view 
which is in contrast to Kelsen itself, but more in line with the views of his students Alfred Verdross and Josef L. 
Kunz). 
13 Cf. David Edmonds and John Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between 
Two Great Philosophers (reprint; New York: Harper Collins, 2001). 
14 Cf. Michael Green, ‘Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems’ (2003) 54 Alabama Law Review 365, 381-
389. 
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Norms (published posthumously in 1979)15 towards a rather anti-logical and more positivist 
approach.16 Yet nonetheless his intellectual development during his ‘classical phase’ (from 
circa 1921 to 1960) still represents the richest and most rewarding period in all of Kelsen’s 
work in which he attempted to provide a Kantian or neo-Kantian mooring and transcendental 
undergirding for his legal theory.17 
On the basis of this epistemological and logical groundwork, this paper intends to counter 
the overall claims by Hart and Raz that legal monism as presented by Kelsen is either trivially 
true and therefore not interesting, or interesting, but false. In fact, it will be argued that monism 
is both logically true and interesting, since it is able to provide any observer of the law with 
new information which goes beyond mere tautological truths. Through its central conceptions 
(such as the strict dichotomy of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’, the basic norm, and the hierarchy of norms), 
the Pure Theory of Law succeeds in explaining the objective meaning of norms,18 which is 
‘legal validity’, and in satisfactorily resolving conflicts between norms of different bodies of 
law. Only monism takes the concept of legal validity seriously,19 as will be explained in more 
detail below, and therefore it cannot be uninteresting to lawyers.  
 
 
H.L.A. HART AND KELSEN’S UNITY DOCTRINE 
 
According to Hart, it is Kelsen’s most serious mistake to claim that all valid laws necessarily 
form a single system. The monist theory of national and international law, Hart continues, is 
simply unsuccessful because of the major fallacies Kelsen overlooked when envisaging this 
doctrine.20 Despite certain similarities between Hart and Kelsen and the latter’s (albeit limited) 
influence on the former, Hart is rather anxious to clarify that his theory differs from the Pure 
                                                             
15 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (reprint; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011). Cf. also Ota Weinberger, 
‘Logic and the Pure Theory of Norms’ in Richard Tur and William Twining (eds), Essays on Kelsen (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986) 188. 
16 In the sense of ‘contingent’ or ‘a posteriori’ and thus in contrast to ‘necessary’ and ‘a priori’. 
17 Stanley L. Paulson, ‘Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization’ (1998) 18 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 153, 155; Carsten Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache: Zur Normentheorie Hans 
Kelsens (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997) 43. 
18 Cf. Brian H. Bix, ‘Rules and Normativity in Law’ in Michał Araszkiewicz, Paweł Banaś, Tomasz Gizbert-
Studnicki, and Krzysztof Płeszka (eds), Problems of Normativity, Rules, and Rules-Following (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2015) 135. 
19 Alexander Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek (eds), Constitutional 
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 354-355. 
20 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Answers to Eight Questions’ in Luís Duarte D’Almeida, James Edwards, and Andrea Dolcetti 
(eds), Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 290. 
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Theory of Law in important ways.21 In this vein, Hart is a force to be reckoned with, and there 
is no way around his arguments.22  These very arguments will now be discussed in three 
separate steps:23 (1) the strong version of monism; (2) the problem of the basic norm; and (3) 
the principle of validating purport and the weak version of monism.24 All of these arguments 
will subsequently subjected to close scrutiny in order to save legal monism from theoretical 
obsolescence and absurdity. 
 
The Strong Version of Monism: Logical and Epistemological Necessity 
At the outset, Hart distinguishes between two versions of legal monism in Kelsen’s writings:25 
a strong version, according to which international and national law from one single legal order 
by logical and epistemological necessity;26 and a weaker version which states that although it 
is not necessarily true that all valid laws form one single legal order, it is, however, just the 
case as an empirical contingency that they do form such a single legal order.27 Yet the first 
problem in Hart’s argument is that this distinction between these two different versions of 
monism cannot be sustained. Kelsen nowhere expounds a weak version of monism by 
exclusively pointing to the existence of the effectiveness principle as the positive legal 
provision that anchors the recognition of States in the existence of efficacious territorial legal 
orders of coercive rule.28 
                                                             
21 Cf. in particular A.W. Brian Simpson, Reflections on The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011) 114; Nicola Lacey, A Life of HLA Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004) 249-253. 
22 For an interesting debate on Hart and Kelsen’s influence on legal philosophy during the twentieth century cf. 
e.g., Brian Leiter, ‘The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Century’ (2005) 36 Rutgers Law 
Journal 165, 168: Kelsen and Hart are the ‘the two dominant figures in twentieth-century legal philosophy’; John 
Mikhail, ‘“Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face”: Jurisprudence and H.L.A. Hart’ (2007) 95 Georgetown 
Law Journal 733, 734: ‘[M]ost scholars would agree that Hart and Kelsen are the century’s two greatest legal 
philosophers’; John Gardner, ‘Publication Review: A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream’ 
(2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 329, 333: ‘[O]nly Hans Kelsen seriously challenges Hart's claim to be the most 
important legal philosopher of the twentieth century’; Christoph Kletzer, ‘The Role and Reception of the Work 
of Hans Kelsen in the United Kingdom’ in Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner, and Klaus Zeleny (eds), Hans Kelsen 
anderswo – Hans Kelsen abroad (Vienna: Manz, 2010) 144-157. 
23 Cf. Giudice (n 9) 157. 
24 As a fourth argument, one could add Hart’s criticism that Kelsen cannot accept conflicts between valid laws in 
analogy to the logical principle of non-contradiction; cf. Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’ (n 5) 565-
574. Since the later Kelsen has, however, given up this claim and accepted the existence of normative conflicts 
(cf. especially Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (n 15) 106-114 and 123-127), this problem need not concern us 
at this point; cf. Hart, ‘Answers to Eight Questions’ (n 20) 290. 
25 Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’ (n 5) 554. 
26 Cf. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (2nd edn; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967) 
329. 
27  Cf. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (re-issue edn; New Brunswick/London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2007) 371-372; Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 330-331. 
28 Alexander Somek, ‘Kelsen Lives’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 409, 426. Cf. also Hart, 
‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’ (n 5) 560-561. 
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Let us nonetheless engage with Hart’s objections against Kelsen’s strong version of 
monism. Because of his artificial distinction into a weak and strong version of monism, Hart 
erroneously postulates that very little is to be found in support of the stronger thesis in Kelsen’s 
works – even though Kelsen’s entire work rests on this alleged strong version and his 
epistemological claims as derived from Kant and the neo-Kantians. Thus, quite the contrary is 
the case, and if there is any support for legal monism, it is to be found in these epistemological 
claims. For Kelsen, monism is an epistemological postulate of legal theory, as it is logically 
impossible to conceive of simultaneously valid norms belonging to different and mutually 
independent systems.29 The reason for this can be explained on the basis of the following line 
of argumentation which concurrently serves as a positive support for legal monism: Kelsen 
begins his Pure Theory of Law in both editions with the statement that, as a theory of positive 
law in general, its purpose is to know and to cognize its subject-matter, i.e. the law, in order to 
be able to describe it objectively and scientifically.30 Thus his theory needs to be understood 
as a universal epistemological tool which is capable of cognizing any positive legal order.31 To 
this end, Kelsen states that the source of his epistemological thoughts, elaborated in his theory, 
is based on Kant’s transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of his neo-Kantian 
successors.32 In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant undertook to search for the 
principles of our experience that are both genuinely informative and universally and necessarily 
true – the so-called synthetic a priori33 which provides us with knowledge independent of 
empirical experience (a priori), but which nonetheless carries new information that goes 
beyond the mere clarification of what was already implicit in the given concepts (synthetic).34 
In the same vein, Kelsen intends his theory to be capable of cognizing and identifying any 
given legal order a priori35 as well as providing the observer with knowledge about said legal 
order. In other words, logically speaking, his theory is necessarily true, but it also provides the 
lawyer with information beyond mere trivial truths. 
                                                             
29 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 363 and 373. 
30 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory: A Translation of the First Edition of the Reine 
Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law (translated by Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson; Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997) 1; Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 1. 
31 Heinz Mayer, ‘Reine Rechtslehre und Gemeinschaftsrecht’ in Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner, and Klaus 
Zeleny (eds), Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht (Vienna: Manz, 2004) 121. 
32 Hans Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law, “Labandism”, and Neo-Kantianism: A Letter to Renato Treves’ in 
Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds), Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on 
Kelsenian Themes (reprint; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007) 173. 
33 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A 10 / B 14-19. 
34 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (rev. edn; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 89-93. 
35 Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1920) 
vi. 
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However, such cognition of the law is only possible if one strictly adheres to the 
separation of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ and thereby eliminates from the object of legal cognition all alien 
elements and everything that is not strictly law, such as metaphysics, theology, politics, 
psychology, sociology, and ethics.36 More concretely, Kelsen emphasizes that the purity of a 
theory of legal cognition must be secured in two directions: firstly, it is to be secured against 
the ‘Is’ and ‘the claims of a so-called “sociological” point of view,’ and secondly it must also 
be ‘secured against the claims of the natural law theory, which […] takes legal theory out of 
the realm of positive legal norms and into the realm of ethico-political postulates.’37 Law hence 
is, on the one hand, separate from morality as an act ‘posited’ by human beings, and therefore 
a positive ‘Is’; but at the same time it is, on the other hand, also separate from fact by being 
obeyed, and if not obeyed, by being applied, which amounts to a normative ‘Ought’.38 In other 
words, the ‘Ought’ is irrevocably separated from the ‘Is’, and yet the former is to be treated as 
a descriptive ‘Is’, because of its posited nature.39 
As a result, the validity of a given posited legal norm is not dependent on its substantive 
moral value or sociological facts, but rather on the formal procedures under which it has been 
created (and thus on the question whether it actually forms part of a given legal system40). In 
Kelsen’s words, the reason for the validity of one given legal norm can only be the validity of 
another norm,41 and not its conformity with moral standards or empirical facts. According to 
the concept of the hierarchy of norms (Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung), which was first 
developed by Kelsen’s colleague Adolf Julius Merkl and only later incorporated by Kelsen into 
his Pure Theory of Law,42 any given legal order – even the most primitive one where a chieftain 
wields absolute power – necessarily consists of at least two normative levels. The reason for 
this is that the very enthronization of said chieftain requires prior normative authorization.43 
                                                             
36 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 1. 
37 Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (2nd edn; Tübingen: Scientia, 1923) v. 
38 Hans Kelsen, ‘On the Pure Theory of Law’ (1966) 1 Israel Law Review 1, 2. 
39  Wolfgang Meyer-Hesemann, ‘Zur rechtstheoretischen Rekonstruktion der Reinen Rechtslehre’ [1984] 
Rechtstheorie (Beiheft 5) 63, 66. 
40 Eugenio Bulygin, ‘Das Problem der Geltung bei Kelsen’ in Stanley L. Paulson and Michael Stolleis (eds), Hans 
Kelsen: Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2005) 82-83. 
41 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 198. 
42  Cf. inter alia, Martin Borowski, ‘Concretized Norm and Sanction qua Fact in the Vienna School’s 
Stufenbaulehre’ (2014) 27 Ratio Juris 79, 79; and Stanley L. Paulson, ‘On the Implications of Kelsen’s Doctrine 
on Hierarchical Structure’ (1996) 18 Liverpool Law Review 49, 49. Cf., however, also Luís Duarte d’Almeida, ‘In 
Canonical Form: Kelsen’s Doctrine of the “Complete” Legal Form’ in Lúis Duarte d’Almeida, John Gardner, and 
Leslie Green (eds), Kelsen Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 
276, drawing attention to differences in the use of the term ‘norm’ by Merkl and Kelsen. 
43 Adolf Julius Merkl, Die Lehre von der Rechtskraft entwickelt aus dem Rechtsbegriff (Leipzig/Vienna: Deuticke, 
1923) 208-209, and fn 2; Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Gesetzesrecht und Richterrecht’ in Hans R. Klecatsky, René 
Marcic, and Herbert Schambeck (eds), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule: Schriften von Hans Kelsen, Adolf 
Merkl, Alfred Verdross, Band 2 (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2010) 1326. 
P. Gragl 
 8 
Therefore any legal order is necessarily ordered in a hierarchical manner and contains at least 
one level of ‘absolute norm-creation’ and one level of ‘absolute norm-application’,44 but more 
sophisticated legal orders usually possess more than two hierarchical levels of legal norms. It 
is typical of them to contain intermediate steps which – in Merkl’s parlance – are determining 
as well as determined norms. These norms, however, do not stand side by side in an unrelated 
fashion, but depend on one another in a genetic relationship.45 And it is this connection, chain, 
or relation between determining norms (i.e. norms determining the creation and the reason of 
validity of lower norms) and determined norms (i.e. norms whose creation and validity is 
determined by higher norms) to which Merkl refers as the Delegationszusammenhang46 (which 
may roughly be translated as the chain of delegation or authorization). Thus, if an observer of 
the law intends to ascertain whether a given norm φ (say, a contract between two individuals) 
forms part of the law or not, they only need to examine whether this norm was created in 
accordance with the relevant statutory rules on valid contracting. The question whether the 
respective statute is valid law, can then in turn be answered by way of scrutinizing whether it 
was created in accordance with the constitution. Thus it becomes quite easy to ascertain 
whether any given norm forms part of the law or not by way of gradually increasing 
individualization and concretization of the law47, if one starts at the apex of a legal order. The 
validity of the constitution itself is based on an older constitution, predating the one currently 
in force. Eventually we reach a constitution which is historically the first and which was laid 
down by a usurper, or by some kind of assembly. The validity of this very first constitution is 
the last presupposition, or final postulate, on which the validity of all norms of a given legal 
order depends.48 In epistemological terms, the hierarchy of norms is in that way capable of 
resolving the question whether a certain norm is a valid legal norm and thus part of a given 
legal order.49 
                                                             
44 Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz’ in Hans R. Klecatsky, René Marcic, and Herbert Schambeck 
(eds), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule: Schriften von Hans Kelsen, Adolf Merkl, Alfred Verdross, Band 1 
(Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2010) 896; Merkl, ‘Gesetzesrecht und Richterrecht’ (n 43) 1325-1326; Merkl, Lehre 
von der Rechtskraft (n 43) 210. 
45 Jürgen Behrend, Untersuchungen zur Stufenbaulehre Adolf Merkls und Hans Kelsens (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1977) 16-17. 
46 Adolf Julius Merkl, ‘Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaus’ in Hans R. Klecatsky, René 
Marcic, and Herbert Schambeck (eds), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule: Schriften von Hans Kelsen, Adolf 
Merkl, Alfred Verdross, Band 2 (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2010) 1098-1099. 
47 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1925) 232-235. 
48 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 115. 
49 Hans Tessar, Der Stufenbau nach der rechtlichen Autorität und seine Bedeutung für die juristische Interpretation 
(Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2010) 42. 
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But what lies beyond this historically first constitution? Where does its validity originate? 
Both Kelsen and Merkl certainly admit that the search for the reason of a norm’s validity cannot 
go on indefinitely, like the search for the cause of an effect.50 Therefore, in order to avoid a 
regressus ad infinitum, this search is terminated by the highest norm, which represents the last 
reason of validity within a normative system.51 This highest norm is called the basic norm or 
Grundnorm, which – in a way similar to Frege’s axiomatic foundation of logic52 or Kant’s 
transcendental self53 – is presupposed and cannot be ‘posited’, i.e. it cannot be created by an 
authority whose competence to do so would have to derive from still a higher norm. Thus the 
basic norm is the common source for the validity of all norms belonging to a given legal order,54 
and all norms whose validity can be traced back to one and the same basic norm form a 
normative system. It therefore constitutes, as one single source and in a dynamic manner, the 
bond between all the various norms of which an order consists.55 Epistemologically speaking, 
the Grundnorm is the Pure Theory’s reply to the question of how we can cognize valid law in 
a fashion, similar to Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ through which he realized that a priori 
(i.e. necessary) knowledge is not possible by conforming intuition to the nature of objects, but 
by conforming the object to our intuition.56 Equally, Kelsen remarks that legal cognition is only 
possible if said ‘[c]ognition itself creates its objects, out of materials provided by the senses 
and in accordance with its immanent laws.’57 And that is why the Grundnorm constitutes the 
                                                             
50 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 194. 
51 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 111; Merkl, Lehre von der Rechtskraft (n 43) 209 and 223; 
Merkl, ‘Prolegomena einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaus’ (n 46) 1091 and 1098. 
52 Cf. in particular Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (translated by Montgomery Furth; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1964) 15; Gottlob Frege, ‘Logic’ in Hans Hermes et al. (eds), Gottlob Frege: 
Posthumous Writings (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) 126-127; Gottlob Frege, ‘Thoughts’ in Brian 
McGuinness (ed), Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1984) 363. Gottlob Frege considered it crucial to regard the meanings with which logic is concerned as being 
independent from human beings and their psychological states and activities. Otherwise, logic would not be a set 
of necessary, but contingent laws. Therefore Frege regarded the method through which logical truths are justified 
as a case of logic justifying itself, and the question of why and how we can acknowledge a law of logic to be true 
can only be answered by reducing said law to another law of logic. And where this is not possible, logic can give 
no answer to that question.  
53  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (n 33) B 131-134. The obscure notion of the transcendental self is best 
understood as always accompanying a subject’s experiences and representations. In other words, whatever a 
person is thinking, there always is a subject of thought which can never be made an object. Cf. also Green, ‘Hans 
Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems’ (n 14) 392 and fn 119, wherein he compares this relationship between 
the transcendental self and the world it experiences to the relationship between the eye and the visual field. Nobody 
can see their own eye which is responsible for the visual field within the visual field. One could certainly hold up 
a mirror and then see something within the visual field that is rightly called ‘this person’s eye’. But the eye in the 
visual field is not the eye responsible for the visual field. 
54 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 194-195. 
55 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 111. 
56 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (n 33) Preface to the Second Edition, xvii. 
57 Hans Kelsen, ‘Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism’ (as an appendix) to Hans Kelsen, General Theory 
of Law and State (re-issue edn; New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 2007) 434. 
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norm-creating and unifying force of the legal normative order58 by establishing a validity-
relationship between these norms and by being the basis for the validity of all norms belonging 
to this order.59 
Subsequently, the decisive step for legal monism (or rather its strong version, in Hart’s 
parlance) is, however, that there can only be one single Grundnorm for all bodies of law, 
including national and international law. Admittedly, jurists remain free to embrace a dualist 
or pluralist construction of the law which then becomes epistemologically and logically 
possible by way of two or more basic norms.60 But this is only possible at the dear price of 
contaminating the purity of the law by reducing legal validity to factual-empirical criteria61 or 
of giving up the concept of legal validity and the legal nature of the international legal order 
altogether. The reason for this is that non-monist theories such as dualism or pluralism state 
that different legal orders are, prima facie, equally valid, either in entirely distinct (dualism) or 
overlapping spheres (pluralism). The principal problem with this view is, however, that in the 
case of normative conflicts between different bodies of law, one cannot understand both 
occurrences of ‘valid law’ as meaning exactly the same thing. Subsequently, when engaging 
with such a conflict, both dualism and pluralism make the mistake of using the term ‘legal 
validity’ whilst changing its meaning unnoticeably within the argument,62 thereby producing 
                                                             
58 Cf. Uta Bindreiter, ‘Presupposing the Basic Norm’ (2001) 14 Ratio Juris 143, 147: ‘the basic norm is the source 
of a dynamically grounded unity’; Behrend (n 45) 68-69: ‘the basic norm constitutes the logical unity of the law’; 
Robert Walter, ‘Entstehung und Entwicklung des Gedankens der Grundnorm’ in Robert Walter (ed), 
Schwerpunkte der Reinen Rechtslehre (Vienna: Manz, 1992) 47: ‘through the Grundnorm, the object of “positive 
law” achieves its unity’. 
59 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 195. 
60 Michael Potacs, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und ihren Mitgliedstaaten im Lichte traditioneller Modelle’ 
(2010) 65 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 117, 123; Theodor Schilling, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Völkerrecht, 
Gemeinschaftsrecht und staatlichem Recht’ in Stefan Griller and Heinz Peter Rill (eds), Rechtstheorie: 
Rechtsbegriff – Dynamik – Auslegung (Vienna/New York: Springer, 2011) 153-156; Griller, ‘Völkerrecht und 
Landesrecht’ (n 1) 87-88. 
61 Alfred Rub, Hans Kelsens Völkerrechslehre: Versuch einer Würdigung (Zurich: Schulthess Polygraphischer 
Verlag, 1995) 454. 
62 Cf. Green, ‘Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems’ (n 14) 366-367. For example, an international legal 
norm could obligate a State to prohibit torture in any event, whilst the domestic law of the same State commands 
the national authorities to torture terrorist suspects, making joint obedience impossible. A dualist State might 
resolve the conflict in favour of national law, claiming that ‘national interests have priority’, thereby effectively 
denying the validity of the international norm in question. And a pluralist-minded State would most likely refrain 
from resolving the conflict all, which would subject the whole situation to a dilemma for the individuals involved. 
What both scenarios have in common is that legal validity must simply have a different meaning within the dualist 
and pluralist theories: in dualism, the validity of an international norm is denied in favour of national law on extra-
legal grounds, and thus the international legal norm is somehow ‘less’ valid than national law; in pluralism, the 
logical rule of non-contradiction would also demand a different meaning, since eventually one of the two norms 
would be applied arbitrarily, either by action (the national norm) or by omission (the international norm), but 
without any legal specification. This entails that the two legal norms in conflict are valid in a different sense 
without any legal grounding. Yet since ‘legal validity’ is equivalent with the very existence of a legal norm, the 
assumption of ‘less’ validity or simply a varying degree of validity is incommensurable with an objectively 
comprehensible analysis of the law. 
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an equivocation in it.63 Hence dualists and pluralists should be well aware that what they are 
actually talking about may no longer be law.64 Thus the concept of legal monism protects the 
law from methodological arbitrariness65 and acts, through the Grundnorm, as a functional 
precondition of the legal science and thereby as an epistemological tool to outline its object of 
cognizance.66 In this vein, any construction other than monism will necessarily result in an 
equivocation or outright denial of the legal nature of international law,67 and a plurality of basic 
norms is – under these assumptions – consequently inconceivable. The ultimate conclusion of 
the postulate that the same ought to be cognized as the same68 is that, as Kelsen himself puts 
it, ‘[t]he unity of the epistemological standpoint demands imperiously a monistic view,’69 and 
international law and national law form part of the same legal order under one common basic 
norm.70 
Hart correctly summarizes that these claims can be reduced to the contention that all law 
forms a single system since there is a form of knowledge in the shape of legal cognition which 
studies both national and international law as subsumable under the single description ‘valid 
laws’ and hence constitutes ‘its object’ as a unity.71 Hart, however, does not engage properly 
with Kelsen’s use of Kant’s unitary object of cognizance, and is to be criticized for brushing 
off this argument in one single sentence, stating: ‘Surely we might as well attempt to deduce 
from the existence of the history of warfare or the science of strategy that all wars are one or 
all armies are one.’72 
                                                             
63 Cf. e.g., Maria J. Frápolli, ‘Identity, Necessity, and Prioricity: The Fallacy of Equivocation’ (1992) 13 History 
and Philosophy of Logic 91-109. 
64 Somek, ‘Kelsen Lives’ (n 28) 425. 
65 Stefan Hammer, ‘Kelsens Grundnormkonzeption als neukantianische Erkenntnistheorie des Rechts?‘ in Stanley 
L. Paulson and Robert Walter (eds), Untersuchungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre (Vienna: Manz, 1986) 226. 
66 Robert Walter, ‘Wirksamkeit und Geltung’ (1961) 11 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht 531, 539-540; Robert 
Walter, Der Aufbau der Rechtsordnung (2nd edn; Vienna: Manz, 1974) 13; Manfred Rotter, ‘Die Reine 
Rechtslehre im Völkerrecht – eine eklektizistische Spurensuche in Theorie und Praxis’ in Robert Walter, Clemens 
Jabloner, and Klaus Zeleny (eds), Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht (Vienna: Manz, 2004) 56. 
67 Somek, ‘Kelsen Lives’ (n 28) 425; Joseph G. Starke, ‘Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law’ 
(1936) 17 British Yearbook of International Law 66, 74. 
68 Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Kelsen – Which Kelsen? A Reapplication of the Pure Theory to International Law’ (2009) 
22 Leiden Journal of International Law 225, 234. 
69 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (n 35) 123. 
70 The question of which body of law – international law or national law – holds superior rank within this unified 
legal order is deliberately left unresolved at this point. This issue will be discussed and resolved in the subsequent 
section. 
71 Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’ (n 5) 564. Cf. also Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 328-329; 
Hans Kelsen, ‘Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus’ in Hans R. 
Klecatsky, René Marcic, and Herbert Schambeck (eds), Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule: Schriften von Hans 
Kelsen, Adolf Merkl, Alfred Verdross, Band 1 (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2010) 250. 
72 Hart, ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law’ (n 5) 565. 
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Hart’s objection fails for two reasons. First, Hart’s argument does not work because his 
analogy of warfare does not work. Not only is it common sense that law and war are not 
relevantly similar, but it is also crucial to recall that Kelsen’s legal monism flows from the 
logic of norms and the nature of normativity. As a consequence, there is no reason why Kelsen 
would be committed to a similar account where, because in warfare as an empirical fact, logic 
and normativity have no application.73 They would certainly apply to the law of warfare, but 
that is not what Hart means.  
Second, Hart appears to misunderstand a particular element of Kantian philosophy, 
namely the unitary object of cognizance. To conceive of specific objects as a transcendental 
unity does not mean that these objects are all the same – this would be too simple a solution. 
What this unity entails is, in Kant’s words, a ‘productive synthesis’74 of empirical data into one 
single concept.75 Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception is the a priori ground of all 
concepts through which all of the manifold given in an empirical sensation is united into a 
concept of the object.76 In other words, all wars or all armies are not one in the same way as all 
laws are not one. But what is the same is the conceptual cognition of these objects, and their 
belonging to their respective unitary concept of ‘war’, ‘army’, or ‘law’. The Second World War 
is not the same as the American Civil War, but they form a unitary object of cognizance ‘war’ 
by being observed as a large-scale armed conflict between different parties. Equally, the crime 
of murder is not the same as the crime of theft, but they both form part of the unitary object of 
cognizance ‘law’ by being cognized as part of an effective, self-creating, and coercive 
normative system which has been posited by human beings for the regulation of their 
behaviour.77 The essentiale of law ultimately is its validity which is coterminous with its very 
existence78 and not subject to gradation. Either a specific legal norm is valid (and hence 
                                                             
73 Giudice (n 9) 157. 
74 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (n 33) A 118-119. 
75  Ibid., A 250-215 and B 139. Cf. also Soon-U Hwang, Identitätsbewusstsein und Objektivität bei Kant 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002) 52; Heinrich Lange, ‘Der Begriff der Einheit in transzendental-
logischer Bestimmung’ (1972) 63 Kant-Studien 399-425. 
76 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (n 33) B 139-140. Cf. also Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 229 and 356. 
77  Cf. Heinz Mayer, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer and Karl Stöger, Grundriss des Österreichischen 
Bundesverfassungsrechts (11th edn; 2015) para 2, and Heinz Peter Rill, ‘Internationales, supranationales und 
nationales Recht – eine Einheit’ in Clemens Jabloner, Dieter Kolonovits, Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Hans René 
Laurer, Heinz Mayer, and Rudolf Thienel (eds), Gedenkschrift Robert Walter (Vienna: Manz, 2013) 688; Clemens 
Jabloner, ‘Der Rechtsbegriff bei Hans Kelsen’ in Stefan Griller and Heinz Peter Rill (eds), Rechtstheorie: 
Rechtsbegriff – Dynamik – Auslegung (Vienna/New York: Springer, 2011) 23. 
78 Kelsen thus follows the philosophical tradition which denies that existence is an additional property or predicate 
of entities; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics (ed. and transl. by Jonathan Barnes) 1028a 13-15; David Hume, A Treatise 
of Human Nature (1738) book I, part II, section VI; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (n 33) A 600 / B 628; Bertrand 
Russell, ‘On Denoting’ (1905) 14 Mind 479-493; Gottlob Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau: 
Koebner, 1884) § 53. 
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binding) and therefore exists, or it is invalid and therefore does not exist.79 This means that all 
law forms a unitary object of cognizance qua validity which derives from the Grundnorm as 
the very fount of this validity. The unity of the law can hence only be denied if one excludes 
the entire international legal order from the system of law. Only then would the two orders – 
national and international law – be located on two completely different levels of cognition and 
the epistemological unity would disappear.80 The ‘validity’ of national law would then have a 
meaning different from the ‘validity’ of international law. 
Third, Hart’s implicit criticism that either Kelsen is right, but what he claims is trivially 
true and thus not interesting, or that Kelsen’s claim is interesting but false, is also to be rejected. 
It might be correct to say that the way of how Kelsen reaches his epistemological conclusion 
on the basis of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy is terrifyingly trivial,81 because to claim 
that all law is law qua being law and thus forms ‘one law’ is necessarily true, but this would of 
course not be an interesting claim. Analytic a priori claims (‘all bachelors are unmarried’) are 
certainly always and trivially true and hence uninteresting. The decisive argument is, however, 
that Kelsen’s claims are not analytic a priori, but synthetic a priori claims in the Kantian 
sense82 and therefore not inevitably uninteresting due to their necessary nature. This means, 
alternatively put, that his claims entail propositions whose predicate concepts are not already 
contained in the respective subjects,83 or that certain interesting consequences follow from 
them which were not immediately perceptible. The most important consequence of these 
synthetic a priori claims is that only the presupposition of one single Grundnorm allows for 
the cognition of valid law, whilst the assumption of two (as in dualism) or more basic norms 
(as in pluralism) prevents such cognition. The reason for that is that assuming the existence of 
more than one basic norm will necessarily result in an equivocation of the meaning of ‘legal 
validity’, which would thereby destroy the very essence of the law. Furthermore, in contrast to 
dualism or pluralism, monism does not surrender when it comes to normative conflicts. Instead, 
                                                             
79 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 10; Hans Kelsen, ‘Law and Logic’ in Hans Kelsen, Essays in Legal and 
Moral Philosophy (selected and introduced by Ota Weinberg; Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973) 229. Cf. also Riccardo 
Guastini, ‘The Basic Norm Revisited’ in Lúis Duarte d’Almeida, John Gardner, and Leslie Green (eds), Kelsen 
Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 69, and Amedeo G. Conte, 
‘Hans Kelsen’s Deontics’ in Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds), Normativity and Norms: 
Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (reprint; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007) 331-334. 
80 Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (n 35) 124; Jochen von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory 
of Hans Kelsen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 79-80. 
81 With regard to Kantian epistemology, cf. Allen Hazen, ‘Logic and Analyticity’ in Achille C. Varzi (ed), The 
Nature of Logic (European Review of Philosophy Vol. 4 (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1999) 92. 
82 Cf. also William E. Conklin, The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism: A Re-Reading of a Tradition (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Law, 2001) 221; Marco Haase, Grundnorm – Gemeinwille – Geist (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2004) 244-
245. 
83 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (n 33) A 6-7 / B 10-11. 
P. Gragl 
 14 
monism rather asks: what will happen next? What is the legal significance of the two norms in 
question? If the other norm in question is not a legal norm at all, but a moral norm or political 
courtesy, the dichotomy of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ would certainly require that the legal norm be 
applied. And in contrast to dualism and pluralism which may attempt to resolve normative 
conflicts by taking recourse to extra-legal solutions, monism’s subsequent question will always 
be: what will legally happen next?84 
This is exactly what is at stake in the question of whether the law forms one system or 
not, namely how the law is to be cognized and applied, and how lawyers can be enabled to 
resolve conflicts between legal norms. In sum, Hart’s objection to the epistemological necessity 
of legal monism is mistaken and fails to convince on all grounds. 
 
The Conundrum of the Basic Norm 
Yet it is exactly this very basis of normativity in the Pure Theory of Law with which Hart also 
takes considerable issue: the Grundnorm. In Hart’s own theory, the foundation of a legal 
system lies in the ‘rule of recognition’ which, as an accepted and practized social rule, provides 
the criteria for identifying all types of rules as rules and hence members of a given system.85 
Thus, in contrast to the transcendental nature of the basic norm, the rule of recognition simply 
is a sociological and present matter of fact86 which can be expressed by utterances such as ‘it 
is the law that …’ in the practice of courts, officials, and private persons.87 By establishing this 
extra-systemic foundation of the law on the basis of social practice, however, Hart unduly 
interfuses empirical facts and the normativity of the law and thereby transgresses the dichotomy 
of the ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’.88 In Humean89 and Kelsenian terms, such derivation of legal norms 
                                                             
84 Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the Undead’ (n 19) 354-355. 
85 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 100. Cf. also Grant Lammond, ‘The Rule of Recognition and the Foundations 
of a Legal System’ in Luís Duarte D’Almeida, James Edwards, and Andrea Dolcetti (eds), Reading HLA Hart’s 
The Concept of Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 98-102; Michael Pawlik, ‘Der Rechtsbegriff bei H.L.A. 
Hart’ in Stefan Griller and Heinz Peter Rill (eds), Rechtstheorie: Rechtsbegriff – Dynamik – Auslegung 
(Vienna/New York: Springer, 2011) 45-50. 
86  John Finnis, ‘Revolutions and the Continuity of Law’ in Alfred W.B. Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence: Second Series (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973) 55. 
87 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 89 and 107. Cf. also Sylvie Delacroix, ‘Hart’s and Kelsen’s Concepts of 
Normativity Contrasted’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 501, 505; Raimo Siltala, A Theory of Precedent (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000) 223. 
88 Jean D’Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart in Today’s International Legal Scholarship’ in Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean 
d’Aspremont (eds), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014) 138-139; Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective (London: 
Routledge, 2011) 208. 
89 Cf. Hume (n 78) book III, part I, section I: ‘[…] I am surprised to find [in every system of morality] that instead 
of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, 
or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; 
Jurisprudence 
 
 
15 
from social practice is unacceptable,90 but – in the context of this section – need not bother us 
any further at this point. 
What is more important is Hart’s critique of the Grundnorm which he regards, when 
accepting the constitution as a living reality, as ‘a needless reduplication to suggest that there 
is a further rule to the effect that the constitution (or those who “laid it down”) are to be 
obeyed.’91 This allegation of reduplication is based on the fact that the basic norm and the 
historically first constitution share two distinctive features, namely that both are effective and, 
as their validity is merely presupposed, non-valid.92 The constitution cannot be valid unless the 
Grundnorm is presupposed, since the constitution’s validity depends on authorization by a 
superior norm; and the Grundnorm itself is also non-valid because if it were valid, there would 
be no need of presupposing its validity.93 In this light, Hart therefore does not see any added 
value in presupposing a transcendental basic norm if all it does is reduplicating the constitution 
on a higher and impalpable level.94 
Before we now continue with the discussion, another related facet which has, so far, been 
deliberately been omitted, needs to be explained. When arguing in favour of monism, two 
different questions need to be distinguished: on the one hand, whether monism is correct 
(something that has now been established); and on the other hand, which body of law – 
international law or national law – is superior within this unitary legal order in the case of 
normative conflict. It is exactly this latter aspect which still requires further elucidation. Kelsen 
formulates two versions of monism, namely monism under the primacy of national law and 
monism under the primacy of international law, 95  which are both epistemologically and 
equally correct. The main difference between those two positions only is the location of the 
Grundnorm: if one assumes that national law has primacy, the basic norm is located in this 
                                                             
and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation 
can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this 
precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would 
subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded 
merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.’ 
90 Cf. Gerald J. Postema, Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2011) 285. 
91 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 246. 
92 Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry (London: Routledge, 1963) 196 and 199, 
and Guastini, ‘The Basic Norm Revisited’ (n 79) 70. The term ‘non-valid’ (instead of ‘invalid’) is used here 
because it can be argued that both ‘validity’ and ‘invalidity’ are norm-relative concepts, that is, norms are invalid 
or valid only in relation to another norm permitting its issuing; thus the supreme norm of any given legal order is 
neither valid nor invalid, but non-valid. 
93 Guastini, ‘The Basic Norm Revisited’ (n 79) 70. Cf. also Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 201 et seq. 
94 Although the same objection holds, mutatis mutandis, against Hart’s own rule of recognition; cf. Stephen 
Munzer, Legal Validity (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) 54. 
95 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 339-344. 
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particular body of law; and if one adheres to the primacy of international law, the basic norm 
is located in that body of law. Hence the decisive choice for one of them is not grounded in 
logic or epistemology, but ideology (‘pacifism versus State sovereignty’), and therefore an 
objective legal science needs to keep a healthy distance from this choice in order to retain its 
purity.96 Whatever version of monism is eventually chosen is irrelevant to Kelsen; the crucial 
point is that dualism or pluralism are logically untenable. 
Kelsen’s ‘choice hypothesis’ was, however, heavily criticized by other members of the 
Vienna School of Jurisprudence, among them, most notably, Kelsen’s own students, Alfred 
Verdross and Josef L. Kunz.97 Both disagree with the claim that lawyers might freely choose 
their preferred version of monism. In this light, they highlight that only monism under the 
primacy of international law is best equipped to describe and take into account the international 
legal order as it is; not only from a political view and the potential harm unrestricted State 
sovereignty can do to the international legal order, but also from a norm-logical perspective: at 
the end of the day, only the primacy of international law is able to guarantee the connection of 
the material of all positive rules of international law into one system, not the primacy of 
national law. Therefore, if one assumes a monist point of view, only the primacy of 
international law can place both bodies of law into a logically coherent framework.98 
In line with Verdross and Kunz’s criticism, the main argument of this paper also is that 
– in contrast to Kelsen’s view – there are strong epistemological reasons in favour of monism 
under the primacy of international law. If one indeed accepts the primacy of national law, the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda would also be derived from national law. This would mean 
that every single State can, at any time, repeal the chain of delegation and thus the validity of 
international law. International law would consequently owe its legal character to national law 
and would merely be ‘external State law’ in the Hegelian sense that it is dependent on the will 
of the State and its choice whether or not to respect international norms.99 International law 
                                                             
96 Ibid., 342-346. Cf. also Joseph G. Starke, ‘The Primacy of International Law’ in Salo Engel and Rudolf A. 
Métall (eds), Law, State, and International Legal Order (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1964) 311. 
97 Cf. generally Robert Walter, ‘Die Rechtslehren von Kelsen und Verdross unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
des Völkerrechts’ in Robert Walter, Clemens Jabloner, and Klaus Zeleny (eds), Hans Kelsen und das Völkerrecht 
(Vienna: Manz, 2004) 40-42; von Bernstorff (n 80) 97-100. 
98 Cf. in particular Josef L. Kunz, ‘On the Theoretical Basis of the Law of Nations’ (1925) 10 Transactions of the 
Grotius Society 115, 139; Josef L. Kunz, ‘La primauté de droit des gens’ (1925) 6 Revue de droit international et 
de legislation comparée 556, 572 et seq.; Josef L. Kunz, Völkerrechtswissenschaft und Reine Rechtslehre 
(Leipzig: Deuticke, 1923) 82; Alfred Verdross, Die völkerrechtswidrige Kriegshandlung und der Strafanspruch 
der Staaten (Berlin: Engelmann, 1920) 33 et seq.; Alfred Verdross, ‘Grundlagen und Grundlegungen des 
Völkerrechts’ (1921) 29 Niemeyers Zeitschrift für Internationales Recht 65, 82-83. 
99 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820) §§ 330 et seq. 
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therefore becomes a projection of national law,100 and the validity of every single treaty is 
grounded in the domestic legal act which authorizes the relevant State to conclude such treaties. 
Accordingly, every treaty has as many grounds of validity as there are parties to it.101 In a 
manner very similar to dualism, international obligations of States can, under this monist 
premise, only be self-imposed obligations, which can be unmade at any time by abolishing the 
respective municipal legal act authorizing the State to commit to said obligation.102 Strictly 
speaking, the term international ‘obligations’ thus becomes an oxymoron that can never be 
relied upon against the will of the State.103 This view obviously leads to a scenario of global 
anarchy where each State may refuse to be bound by international law and the very treaties it 
has concluded whenever its interests so dictate,104 and where two hundred-odd States would 
thus virtually construe two hundred-odd different international legal orders. The international 
legal order would only exist at the behest of the national legal orders and, most absurdly, there 
would be as many international legal orders as there are national legal orders. Such an utter 
denial of international law would not only be epistemologically impossible if one is committed 
to an objective meaning of the term ‘legal validity’, but also empirically false.105 In fact, it is 
common sense that the doctrine of State primacy is ‘a denial of international law as law’,106 
and must therefore be rejected, if one takes the notion of legal validity seriously. Today, nobody 
seriously endorses this version of monism anymore,107 and only monism under the primacy of 
international law is being accepted as a reasonable choice to theorize the relationship between 
municipal and international law under a monist premise.108  
Yet even under this scenario, Hart considers a basic norm for international law to be a 
comic effort and an empty repetition of the rule that the society of States ought to observe 
certain standards of conduct as obligatory rules.109 According to Hart, Kelsen’s suggested basic 
                                                             
100 André Décencière-Ferrandière, ‘Considérations sur le droit international dans ses rapports avec le droit de 
l’Etat’ (1933) 40 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 8, 64-66. 
101 Max Wenzel, ‘Der Begriff des Gesetzes in der Reichsverfassung’ (1927) 4 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung 
der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 136 ,141 et seq. 
102 Georg Jellinek, Die rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge (Vienna: Hölder, 1880) 9 et seq. and 46 et seq. 
103 Griller, ‘Völkerrecht und Landesrecht’ (n 1) 95. 
104 Edwin Borchard, ‘The Relation between International Law and Municipal Law’ (1940) 27 Virginia Law 
Review 137, 142. 
105  Cf. also András Jakab, ‘Kelsens Völkerrechtstheorie zwischen Erkenntnistheorie und Politik’ (2004) 64 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1045, 1051 fn 30. 
106 Starke, ‘Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law’ (n 67) 77. 
107 Lando Kirchmair, Die Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013) 22-23. 
108 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) para 12. 
109 Nota bene at this point that international law only takes up ‘a relatively small and unimportant part’ in Hart’s 
theory; Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 4 and chapter X in general. Cf. also Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The Concept of 
International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart’ (2011) 21 European Journal of International Law 967, 
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norm of international law, consuetudines sunt servandae, that is, States should behave as they 
have customarily behaved, says nothing more than that those who accept particular rules also 
ought to observe a rule that the rules ought to be observed. This is, again, a useless reduplication 
of the fact that a set of rules are accepted as binding by States as binding rules.110 In other 
words, Hart claims that Kelsen’s Grundnorm of international law has no real informative 
content and hence goes no distance by that a distinct and system-constituting rule exists above 
what Hart would call primary rules of obligation at the international level.  
Yet the problem is that Hart merely focuses on the abstractness of Kelsen’s particular 
formulation of the basic norm, which makes him overlook its actual content.111 If we recall 
Kelsen’s statement in this respect, he provides an account of a hierarchy of norms by stating 
that the basic norm of consuetudines sunt servandae allows for the development of customary 
international law as the first (and supreme) positive-legal stage within the international legal 
order. The customary rule of pacta sunt servanda then allows for the creation of treaties, which 
in turn, provides for the creation of treaty-based organizations and institutions.112 But this is 
exactly the same system-constituting normative hierarchy Hart is establishing on basis of his 
rule of recognition, albeit in a more elusive manner:113 even though this hierarchy of validity 
criteria is also characterized by an order of relative subordination and primacy,114 it remains 
rudimentary in comparison with Merkl and Kelsen’s Stufenbau doctrine and fails to grasp all 
the rules which are considered as applicable and binding in a given legal order.115 
Hart’s allegation of emptiness and reduplication becomes even more erroneous when one 
notices that it is also easy to accuse his rule of recognition of the same charge, e.g. by 
formulating it as ‘unless they are required to do otherwise by valid positive law, officials must 
apply as valid the norms of their own customary behaviour (and not, for example, norms of 
other people’s customary behaviour, or moral norms, etc.).’116 Therefore it is no more accurate 
                                                             
967-968, referring to the ‘shadowy existence of Hart’s concept of international law’; D’Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart 
in Today’s International Legal Scholarship’ (n 88) 114, mentioning Hart’s ‘famous disdain for international law’. 
110 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 230. 
111 Giudice (n 9) 159. 
112 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 369-370; Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 26) 214-217; Hans 
Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart, 1952) 417-418. 
113 Uta Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm? A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen’s Doctrine (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law, 201) 69 fn 3. 
114 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 8) 105-107; this basically means that if certain rules have been identified as valid 
on the basis of a criterion and they then conflict with other rules which have been identified as being valid on the 
basis of another criterion, then the first validity criterion would prevail as superior.  
115 Michael Pawlik, Die Reine Rechtslehre und die Rechtstheorie H.L.A. Harts: Ein kritischer Vergleich (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1993) 155-156; Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm? (n 113) 69 fn 3. Cf. also Joseph Raz, The 
Authority of Law (2nd edn; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 150-151; Douglas Gerber, ‘Levels of Rules 
and Hart’s Concept of Law’ (1972) 81 Mind 102-105. 
116 Giudice (n 9) 159-160. 
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to claim that Kelsen’s attempt amounts to a meaningless reduplication than it would be to say 
that Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition amounts to an empty reduplication.117 
Yet besides Hart’s theoretical attack on Kelsen’s proposed basic norm of international 
law in the shape of consuetudines sunt servandae, there is also one major doctrinal difficulty 
with this particular content of the Grundnorm that needs to be discussed and resolved in order 
to support monism. The problem is that it puts customary international law at the top of the 
hierarchy of positive international law and thereby subordinates the entire international legal 
order to it.118 But since there is no formal hierarchy of sources in public international law, and 
hence all sources – treaties, custom, and general principles – rank as equal,119 no international 
lawyer could therefore accept that treaty law is somehow derived from custom. This 
assumption is hence not capable of describing and explaining the law as it is. Therefore one 
option to save Kelsen’s concept of the basic norm of international law is to return to a 
Grundnorm without any content which merely sets out the transcendental conditions for a 
unified legal order: a terminus for the hierarchy of norms; the fount of the validity of all legal 
norms; and the unifying force of the legal order. Norm-creation, as Jörg Kammerhofer 
suggests, could then be explained by an explicit ‘constitution of international law’ or a 
‘historically first constitution’ as a meta-meta-stratum above pacta sunt servanda and 
consuetudines sunt servandae as the meta-norms on law-creation. Although treaties, custom, 
and general principles would form separate branches of international law,120 they would be 
connected by this superstructure which regulates their interrelationship. This meta-meta-
stratum would need to consist of positive norms, yet it remains doubtful whether such positive 
norms exist.121  
The most promising contender for this meta-meta-law of international law is Article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter: ICJ Statute) as a manifestation 
                                                             
117 Ibid., 160. Cf. also Jeremy Waldron, ‘Who Needs Rules of Recognition?’ in Matthew D. Adler and Kenneth 
E. Himma (eds), The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
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309. 
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law; cf. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and Hugo Thirlway, The Sources of 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 132-141; Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Hans Kelsen’s Place 
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120  Grigory Tunkin, ‘Is General International Law Customary Law Only?’ (1993) 4 European Journal of 
International Law 534, 536. 
121 Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Hans Kelsen’s Place in International Legal Theory’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), 
Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 152. 
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of what is accepted as law-creating in international law.122 It remains uncertain, however, 
whether this provision is even of an actual epistemological value because there might be other 
sources of international law omitted in Article 38.123 Thus the enumeration of sources in this 
provision and its position as a meta-meta-law of international law is only correct if it 
corresponds to the number of meta-norms that actually exists, which means, a fortiori, that it 
is merely declaratory in nature. The reasoning behind Article 38 being declaratory is that it is 
generally accepted as such, and that the meta-norms on international law-creation (i.e. the 
sources of international law) are created by general acceptance. As a result, the real claim here 
is that the epistemological position of Article 38 arises from its correspondence with the meta-
meta-law’s condition for meta-law creation (i.e. general acceptance).124 It nonetheless remains 
doubtful whether Article 38 really constitutes such a meta-meta-law for international law, and 
international lawyers remain rather sceptical about this claim, in particular because of this 
provision’s non-exhaustive character.125  
The problem is that the assumed ‘constitution’ of international law either lacks positivity 
(i.e. it only exists in the minds of international lawyers) or perceptibility (i.e. it is positive, but 
simply very difficult to perceive due to its unwritten nature).126 It is, however, indisputable that 
there are certain constitutionalizing trends in international law,127 and therefore the latter view 
is much more plausible. There is a positive-legal constitution of international law which 
regulates international law-making, but due to its highly fragmented status, it is just very 
difficult to perceive. Yet fragmentation and difficulties in perceiving the elements of this 
constitution do not speak against its positive character – in the same way as the fragmented and 
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mostly uncodified status of the United Kingdom’s constitution does not speak against its 
constitutional nature.128 Besides Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, thus merely enumerating various 
sources of international law in a non-exhaustive manner, the meta-meta-norms of international 
law are complemented by various other sources on international-law creation, such as those 
rules of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties on treaty-making, which are 
universally accepted;129 the relevant rules on the creation of customary international law, as 
explained by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case;130 the gap-filling role of general 
principles to avoid the problem of non liquet;131 certain types of unilateral declarations;132 and 
decisions of international organizations.133 Soft law, however, needs to be excluded from this 
list of international legal sources. The reason for this is that it lacks formally binding force, and 
given the strict binary character of the law as being either valid and existent or invalid and non-
existent, there is no room for a grey area of being ‘a little valid’ in between.134 
Thus, at the end of the day, if one can accept Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and an unwritten 
and yet positive ‘constitution’ of international law as the meta-meta-law of the international 
legal order, there would be no need to bestow any duplicating content upon the Grundnorm as 
criticized by Hart, and it could remain the transcendental entity which it was originally 
envisaged to be. This Grundnorm would then constitute the reason for the validity of the quasi-
constitution of international law, i.e. its meta-meta-law in the shape of Article 38 ICJ Statute 
plus other sources of international law-making, which sets out the conditions for law-creation, 
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i.e. the meta-law as constituted by the principles of pacta sunt servanda, consuetudines sunt 
servandae, etc. 
In conclusion, Hart’s criticism of Kelsen’s theory of the Grundnorm cannot only be 
negatively rebutted, but can also serve as an excellent starting point to engage in a discussion 
which extensively and positively supports Kelsen’s concept of the Grundnorm of international 
law, thus corroborating a monist view of the law. 
 
The Weak Version of Monism: The Principle of Validating Purport 
At the outset, it must be clearly emphasized again that Kelsen never distinguishes between a 
strong (i.e. necessary) and weak (i.e. contingent) version of monism. Let us nonetheless engage 
with Hart’s criticism of Kelsen’s ‘principle of effectiveness’ which, in Kelsen’s words, 
legitimizes a coercive national legal order ‘for the territory of its actual effectiveness as a valid 
legal order and the community constituted by this coercive order as a “State” in the sense of 
international law.’135 Hart calls this chain of delegation between international and national law 
the relationship of validating purport, and argues that legal monism fails because it conflates 
this very relationship with the relationship of validation proper. Hart likens this to a fictitious 
situation wherein he writes a paper on Kelsen and concurrently receives a request from the 
Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University to write a paper on Kelsen. Hart concludes that without 
establishing the exact circumstances surrounding these two events, it remains impossible to 
ascertain whether he indeed obeyed the request or not.136 The central problem at stake is that 
of two different intentional states of mind: validation proper denotes a situation where a norm 
is adopted with the intent of creating it on the basis of another one, for instance when a judge 
identifies a particular norm as valid law on the basis of an accepted rule of recognition or if a 
national parliament adopts a legal act in accordance with the relevant constitutional procedures. 
Validating purport, conversely, means that legal norms which fit a certain description, are 
deemed valid regardless of whether they were created in order to become members of the legal 
order containing that description.137 
To emphasize his criticism, Hart provides the hypothetical example of the British 
Parliament passing the Soviet Laws Validity Act which purports to declare all laws currently 
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effective in the Soviet Union to be valid within the United Kingdom.138 This does not, however, 
mean that British and Soviet law form one legal system, because it would be absurd to say that 
Soviet Law derives its validity from the relevant act of Parliament. Alternatively put, it is 
evident that the law of the Soviet Union is valid in the Soviet Union regardless of the validating 
purport of the British statute, since its validity is derived from an accepted rule of recognition 
in the Soviet Union. Hart continues that the same holds true for the relationship between 
international and national law. He states that questions regarding the formation of one single 
system and the derivation of validity of national law from international law (validation proper) 
are not the same as questions whether international law treats national law as forming part of a 
single system with itself and whether national law is valid according to international law on 
the basis of the principle of effectiveness.139 Since the principle of effectiveness is hence a mere 
expression of validating purport built into positive international law, unity between two bodies 
of law cannot be established if one of them recognizes as valid for itself what is valid in the 
other. It simply treats foreign rules in the same manner as its own rules, but it does not ingest 
these foreign rules.140 
However, Hart’s criticism cannot be sustained for three reasons. The first argument 
against Hart is his obvious misinterpretation of Kelsen. To begin with, it is very unlikely that 
Kelsen would have failed to appreciate and to acknowledge the distinction between validation 
proper and validating purport. In his works, Kelsen heavily emphasizes the distinction between 
objective and subjective legal meaning. The ‘Ought’ as the meaning of the norm may have a 
subjective dimension, i.e. it is treated as what someone wishes to be or not to be, for instance 
when somebody states in writing what ought to happen to their belongings after their passing. 
Hence the subjective meaning of this act is a testament. This, however, may not be sufficient, 
because from an objective viewpoint, it may not be a testament in the legal sense as some 
formalities were not observed. Thus the objective meaning denotes what ought to happen 
independently of what anyone wishes to be or not to be.141 After all, it is obvious that usurping 
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and abusing the authority of public offices, as the famous Hauptmann von Köpenick did,142 
only satisfies the subjective, but not the objective meaning of the law, and that the lack of real 
legal authority results in the nullity of the alleged legal act.143 In the same vein Kelsen would 
certainly also have rejected Hart’s idea that the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University can put 
himself in a genuine position of normative authority over Hart by merely purporting to give 
orders to him. As a consequence, it is highly implausible to attribute to Kelsen a principle such 
as validating purport which involves an obvious confusion of objective and subjective legal.144  
Furthermore, there is another aspect to this issue. Hart’s distinction between validation 
proper and validating purport is of a substantive nature, which, however, is entirely beside the 
point to Kelsen’s theory. Kelsen, as is well known, does not explore substance (‘any kind of 
content might be law’145), but only the form in which the legal substance is to be accounted for 
by legal science. Prima facie, it is true that subjective purport may or may not play a role in 
law-creation. Individual parties, for example, can agree to enter into contractual relations 
through mere conduct which is not intended to create a norm.146 Furthermore, in constitutional 
legal terms, some processes of norm-creation might require some intentional use of a particular 
rule,147 but nevertheless, no law can be validly created by the authorized norm-creating body 
unless the relevant procedural rules are thoroughly complied with. Yet, what really matters in 
legal theoretical terms is that whether or not a relation of validation is based on – in Hartian 
terms – validation proper or sheer validating purport, it focuses on the particular substance of 
the legal norm in question.148 And this is clearly an issue with which Kelsen does not concern 
himself. 
The second argument against Hart’s criticism immediately follows from Kelsen’s tacit 
rejection of the distinction between validating purport and validation proper. Hart’s premise of 
‘weak monism’ is only tenable under such a distinction, which he deems crucial to explain the 
phenomenon of ‘system-relative validity’, that is, the existence of several and different rules 
of recognition for different legal systems.149 At best, Hart’s critique is very weak, as it rests on 
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a premise that Kelsen does not share;150 firstly because Kelsen cannot accept a social practice, 
such as Hart’s rule of recognition, as a criterion for validity due to its transgression of the Is-
Ought dichotomy;151 and secondly, because even if one substitutes ‘rule of recognition’ with 
Grundnorm, the idea of various different basic norms for different legal systems is 
incompatible with Kelsen’s legal-epistemological foundations,152 as discussed above. Beyond 
that, the fact that Kelsen does not and cannot support the principle of validating purport also 
helps defend the viability of monism under the primacy of international law. The notion of 
monism under the primacy of international law claims that one must, under epistemological 
considerations, necessarily view national and international law as a unitary legal body in which 
international law is superior, and not, as Hart claims, because the principle of effectiveness 
purports to validate national law.153 Hart fails to acknowledge Kelsen’s argument that the 
existence of a legal system – and thereby the defensibility of a certain construction of that legal 
system – depends on constraints of effectiveness. For Kelsen, it would not be scientific to 
postulate the existence of a particular legal order unless the behaviour it claims to govern also 
exhibits sufficient conformity with the norms of the system.154 The consequence is that monism 
under the primacy of international law has to be compatible with these constraints of 
effectiveness in order to amount to a viable description of the law. This is in fact the case and 
can easily be demonstrated by pointing out the existing system of States and other international 
legal subjects which interact with one another on a regular basis. Moreover, they do so in 
recognition of international law, such as that no State – despite the occasionally serious 
scepticism – seriously denies the legal quality of international law,155 and that international 
obligations are complied with 156  lest States incur international responsibility and risk 
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subsequent sanctions. Hart is therefore wrong in assuming that monism under the primacy of 
international law depends on nothing but a relation of validating purport between the principle 
of effectiveness and national law, and he fails to make the case that monism cannot account for 
State behaviour in a descriptively plausible way.157 
The last argument against Hart’s criticism is that legal monism is in fact able to 
accommodate the example of the Soviet Laws Validity Act quite well, since Hart fails to take 
into account one of the most crucial elements of the Pure Theory of Law: the Stufenbau 
doctrine. Hart is absolutely right in saying that the purported validation of Soviet Law by the 
Soviet Laws Validity Act is not really what validates Soviet Law (except for its use in British 
courts, but this is a question of the conflict of laws).158 Yet Hart commits to an obvious non 
sequitur when assuming that it follows from the fact that the Soviet Laws Validity Act does 
not validate Soviet Law, that British and Soviet Law cannot possibly form part of one and the 
same legal order. If jurists take the viewpoint of monism under the primacy of international 
law, they can certainly argue that both British and Soviet Law form part of one legal order as 
they are both delegated by the principle of effectiveness under international law, and not by a 
validating relationship between British and Soviet Law.159 This makes perfect sense, if we 
remember the hierarchy of norms as originally devised by Merkl, according to which only 
superior norms can validate inferior norms, but legal norms of the same hierarchical level 
cannot validate one another. 160  Therefore in a monist construction under the primacy of 
international law, where British and Soviet Law are located on an equal level of legal hierarchy, 
the Soviet Laws Validity Act, as a British legal act, can never be an authentic validation of 
Soviet law.161 Monism does not claim that one national legal order validates another national 
legal order, and Hart fails in comparing the horizontal relationship between equal bodies of 
law (i.e. national law) with the vertical relationship between hierarchically different bodies of 
law (i.e. international law as the delegating and national law as the delegated body of law, 
respectively).  
In sum, Hart’s critique must therefore be rejected. 
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JOSEPH RAZ AND THE IDENTITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
Joseph Raz is the other legal theorist besides Hart who has critically engaged with Kelsen’s 
theory and his monist claim. In doing so, Raz formed very strong opinions and explicit views 
on Kelsen which he follows through and defends with an impressive philosophic will. And 
although he somewhat rehabilitates Kelsen’s reputation by defending him against Hart on the 
basis of the strength and robustness he sees in Kelsen’s writings,162 Raz is nonetheless of the 
opinion that Kelsen errs in stipulating the Grundnorm as an epistemological requirement at the 
apex of the legal order in order to bestow unity on it.163 In concreto, Raz argues that the reason 
why a basic norm is not necessary for the unity of the legal system can be easily understood by 
examining the following two cases: (1) there are non-identical legal orders which share a 
Grundnorm; and (2) even without the Grundnorm, a unified legal order is possible.164 As will 
become clear in the analysis below, the first argument refers to the hierarchy of norms and the 
chain of delegation, whilst the second argument deals with the basic norm itself. It will also 
become evident that Raz further developed the arguments by Hart, and that they are, for this 
reason, fairly similar.165 And yet for the same reason Raz’s criticism must fail, as it ends up 
misunderstanding and misconstruing Kelsen’s theory.166 
 
Chains of Validity and the Identity of Legal Orders 
At the outset, Raz offers a reconstruction of the most basic tenets of Kelsen’s theory in the 
form of two (in his opinion: flawed) axioms from which two further theorems can be derived. 
For the purposes of the present section, only the first axiom is relevant which reads as follows: 
‘Two laws, one of which directly or indirectly authorizes the creation of the other, belong to 
the same legal system.’ From this, Raz derives the theorem that ‘if one law authorizes the 
creation of another or if both are authorized by a third law, then both belong to the same legal 
system.’167 Thereby this axiom and theorem introduce the concept of a chain of validity. Raz, 
however, emphasizes that they also demonstrate the flaws in Kelsen’s theory: the derived 
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theorem is false as the fact that two norms are linked by a chain of delegation (or validity) is in 
itself insufficient to guarantee that they in fact belong to the same legal order. And if the derived 
theorem is false, so must be the axiom from which it has been derived by way of modus 
tollens.168 
Raz presents a simple example to illustrate his claim that the Grundnorm cannot be the 
decisive criterion for the unity of a given legal order, as it is possible to conceive of non-
identical legal orders sharing a basic norm. If the first axiom – asserting that all the laws 
belonging to one chain of validity are part of one and the same legal order – were indeed true, 
the peaceful granting of independence to new States would be impossible.169 Raz asks to 
imagine that country A has a colony B, and that both territories are governed by the same legal 
order. Now imagine that the ‘motherland’ A grants independence to B on the basis of a law 
that confers exclusive and unlimited legislative powers over B to an assembly or parliament 
elected by the residents of B.170 Eventually, suppose that this assembly or parliament adopts a 
constitution which is generally recognized by the residents of B. Subsequently, elections are 
held and further laws are adopted according to this constitution, and quite naturally, the 
government, courts, and the population of B regard themselves as an independent State with 
an independent legal order.171 And not only has this new State been recognized by all other 
States including A, the courts of A also regard the constitution and laws of B as a separate legal 
order distinct from their own.172 And yet, despite all these facts, Raz highlights, it follows from 
Kelsen’s first axiom that the constitution and laws of B are part of the legal order of A, since 
all laws of B were authorized by the independence-granting law of A in the first place and 
therefore belong to the same chain of validity and to the same legal order.173 This proves that 
the ‘basic norm cannot play the role assigned to it by Kelsen’s criteria of membership and 
identity, and, hence, that these criteria fail to fulfil their function.’174  
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Nevertheless, Raz’s argument is not as stringent as it seems prima facie. To begin with, 
Raz fails to see that what Kelsen has in mind when he talks about the unity of a legal order is 
not a sociological, historical, or political conception of unity, but a legal-normative conception. 
Kelsen postulates that only norms belonging to one and the same legal order can be valid, and 
hence the claim that the law of both A and B are valid is the same as claiming that both belong 
to one and the same legal order.175 However, Kelsen is not committed to the claim that it is 
merely a law enacted in A, purporting to authorize the constitutional system of B, that 
establishes a chain of validity between A and B. Purported chains of validity are only legally 
significant if jurists in country B do not opt for their State’s normative independence. But as 
already explained above with respect to Hart’s critique, Kelsen never assumes that there is a 
direct and immediate chain of delegation between different States (i.e. regardless of 
international law), and therefore jurists in B need not adopt the perspective of absolute 
normative independence in order to avoid a chain of validity between A and B.176  
The second option to rebut Raz’s argument and to show that there is no chain of validity 
is to regard both the laws of A and B as parts of the overarching international legal order qua 
monism.177 Even if one adopts a monist view under the primacy of national law, the conclusion 
that there is only one legal order is inevitable. In this scenario, the basic norm would be located 
at the apex of A’s legal order. Then the validity of B’s constitution would be grounded in a 
norm of A’s constitution, either directly granting validity to the laws of B (which would 
confirm Raz’s critique, however), or granting validity to international law which in turn 
delegates the laws of B. Yet seeing, that monism under the primacy of national law is not only 
practically, but also epistemologically absurd, it is much more plausible to start off from the 
perspective of monism under the primacy of international law. In this case, the chain of validity 
would arise from the basic norm of international law authorizing the positive rules of 
international law which in turn authorize, under the principle of effectiveness, the constitutions 
of both A and B.178 Reliance on the principle of effectiveness therefore has the advantage of 
explaining why the relationship of validating purport between the two States is entirely 
irrelevant with regard to the validity of the laws of B. Once B became independent, it achieved 
effective control of its territory and hence, under the principle of effectiveness, only remains 
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delegated by the international legal order, not A. And since B is neither connected to A via a 
chain of delegation nor normatively independent from international law, Raz’s claim that 
Kelsen’s alleged axiom and theorem are false is to be rejected. Kelsen and Merkl’s theory of 
the chain of delegation simply does not lead to the counter-intuitive example Raz imputes to 
it.179 
 
Again: The Basic Norm 
Raz’s second element of criticism introduces the second axiom of Kelsen’s theory which states 
that ‘all the laws of a legal system are authorized directly or indirectly by one law’ from which 
Raz derives the theorem that ‘two laws, neither of which authorizes the creation of the other, 
do not belong to the same system unless there is a law authorizing the creation of both.’180 In 
this vein, this axiom and theorem give rise to the notion of the Grundnorm, which Raz equally 
considers flawed. Even without Kelsen’s hypothesized basic norm, Raz says, a legal order can 
be unified, and therefore the theorem is false. And if the theorem is false, so is its respective 
axiom.181 
In order to demonstrate his claim, Raz uses the example of a ‘legally minded observer’ 
coming to a country where laws can derive their validity either from a written constitution or a 
customary constitution.182 This observer will subsequently wonder whether the codified and 
the customary constitutions belong to the same legal order. To answer this question, Kelsen 
would refer the observer to the Grundnorm, and reply that since neither of the constitutions 
depends on the other, and since there is no superior positive law which could delegate them, 
the two constitutions can only be authorized by one and the same basic norm. Ergo they belong 
to the same legal order. For Raz, however, this method represents a petitio principii, as he 
regards the basic norm mainly as a power-conferring norm, that is, as authorizing norm-
creation.183 And to identify the relevant authorizing content of the basic norm, according to 
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Kelsen, one must identify ‘the facts through which an order is created and applied.’184 Yet this 
will drive the observer to despair, because then he or she would only be able to identify the 
legal order with the help of the basic norm, whilst the basic norm can only be identified after 
the identity of the legal has been established. Therefore, the Grundnorm represents a vicious 
cycle and cannot solve the problem of identity and unity of legal orders.185 
As a first step, one could counter this argument with reference to the Pure Theory’s 
epistemological a priori truth that the customary constitution and the codified constitution 
cannot fail to belong to the same legal order if they are both valid law.186 Thus, the question 
whether the codified or the customary constitution belong to the same legal order or whether 
there are actually two distinct legal orders in force is not problematic for the Kelsenian legally 
minded observer once it is generally admitted that both are valid law. In this vein, it does not 
make sense to criticize Kelsen for not providing a criterion to answer this question.187 
The problem is that a sceptic will not be convinced by the epistemological force of the 
Pure Theory of Law. As a second step, one could therefore take recourse, as suggested by Vinx, 
to our fictional protagonist, the Kelsenian law-abiding person.188 The interest of such a person 
would be to determine what the law requires, and in order to do so, this person must presuppose 
the Grundnorm to cognize the normative nature of the law. Even an anarchist, according to 
Kelsen, could describe the law as a system of valid and behaviour-regulating norms without 
having to approve of this law.189 Although Raz criticizes this element in Kelsen’s theory as a 
moral statement and thus an impurity, he eventually accepts the role of the basic norm as a 
means for the jurist to pretend that law is a valid system of norms.190 Persisting differences in 
this respect aside191 and in the context of the present analysis, we can consequently agree that 
both Kelsen and Raz would accept such a fictitious law-abiding person. From an empirical 
point of view, this person could find that both the customary and the codified constitution are 
considered to be valid by large groups of members of society, and that he or she must therefore 
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comply with both. Potential conflicts between the two constitutions, however, must somehow 
be resolved, which is only possible by presuming a content of the Grundnorm which makes 
joint compliance possible. Thereby both custom and codified law become normatively 
coordinated parts of the same hierarchy of norms, and the question whether there is one or 
whether there are two legal orders can never become a serious issue for the law-abiding 
person.192 Nonetheless, a Razian sceptic could, at this point, simply reiterate their critique that 
this assumption is begging the question, since to claim that there must be a possibility to comply 
with both custom and statute because of their being valid is only possible if we already know 
that they both form part of the same legal order. What is required here is an independent 
criterion to resolve the issue of identity before the appeal to joint compliance is made.193 
Thus, if we examine the relationship between international and national law, it becomes 
clear that a practice-based criterion, according to which the observer would simply opt for the 
validity of that body of law which enjoys a higher degree of effectiveness, would not work to 
establish the unity of the law. Kelsen himself acknowledges that there are no international law-
applying institutions whose practice of recognition could provide for such a criterion.194 The 
same applies by analogy to the example of the two constitutions. Vinx argues that if we assume 
instances of disagreement among the members of society and its legal practitioners as to 
whether there is a normative relation between the customary and the codified constitution, it is 
possible to imagine that some members of society or the jurists believe, while others deny that 
both constitutions are valid. Equally, one can imagine that both society and jurists agree that 
both are valid, while they disagree with respect to the nature of the normative relationship 
between them. It is exactly this example where practice-based or institutional criteria fail to 
provide a conclusive answer to the question of identity and unity of the law. But a solution 
could be found in the behaviour of the law-abiding person: if we presuppose the effectiveness 
of both constitutions, this law-abiding person will necessarily be biased towards construing the 
broadest possible set of effective rules as parts of one legal order. Thus to deny a norm 
membership in the legal order would be tantamount to denying its legal validity. Yet since this 
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person is interested in upholding the effects of the law, he or she will avoid this validity-
annulling conclusion whenever possible195 – in the same way as authorities interpret customary 
norms in accordance with the set of positive norms and vice versa in order to make them 
applicable without any normative conflicts.196 As a result, Vinx concludes, the law-abiding 
person will base their judgments regarding the structure of the legal order in question on 
hypotheses that cannot be fully explained in terms of sociological or empirical observation. 
Once one adopts the perspective of law-abidingness, Raz’s allegation of circularity does not 
apply anymore, as this allegation presupposes agreement on the point that a satisfactory 
account of the identity of legal orders must be one that appeals to purely descriptive criteria – 
an assumption the Pure Theory of Law rejects altogether.197 
To conclude, it is also possible to recast this rebuttal of Raz in logical terms, namely in 
the form of a Kantian transcendental argument198 through which the sceptic is shown that they 
cannot help but undermine their own position in the course of defending it. In other words, this 
specific argument proves that the truth of its conclusion is a necessary condition of there being 
any cognition of law at all, since if the conclusion were not true, there could be no experience 
to falsify it.199 To this end, Stanley Paulson gives the following example for a transcendental 
argument to corroborate the need for Kelsen’s Grundnorm:200 
 
1. One has cognition of legal norms (given). 
2. Cognition of legal norms is possible only if the category of ‘Ought’ is 
presupposed (via the basic norm) (transcendental premise). 
Ergo:  The category of ‘ought’ (on the basis of the basic norm) is presupposed 
(transcendental conclusion). 
 
To put it succinctly, Raz acknowledges that what Hart’s complex social practice theory 
(on the basis of the rule of recognition) fails to accomplish, namely to endow the legal norms 
of a given system with binding force, can be achieved in Kelsen’s theory by the conferral of 
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‘Ought’ through the basic norm. Due to the purity of the Pure Theory of Law, the Grundnorm 
is the only norm that is capable of conferring validity on the positive law, and nothing else.201 
Thus Raz’s negative view of the basic norm in general does not stand in the way of a sustained 
analysis of Kelsen’s theory, and particularly of the question: ‘In what sense is the basic norm 
presupposed?’202  
In sum, Raz’s critique must therefore be rejected. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
After this extensive analysis, the present conclusion can certainly give only a very brief overall 
appraisal of the Pure Theory of Law, as developed by the Vienna School of Jurisprudence. To 
begin with, one should not underestimate the philosophical foundations of this theory in the 
spirit of Immanuel Kant and his successors, that is, a transcendental philosophy and 
epistemology in the sense that cognition is not concerned with the actual objects of cognition, 
but the manner how we cognize objects, and, more importantly, in so far as this manner of 
cognition is possible a priori’. 203  Equally, one should not forget, however, that Kelsen 
considers the Pure Theory of Law to be a theory of positive law in general,204 not an a priori 
theory. This means that it builds upon the empirically extant legal material and that it develops 
therefrom, in an abstracting fashion, a description of the characteristics that all legal structures 
share throughout space and time.205 Yet what is of an a priori and thereby non-contingent 
nature is the notion of the Grundnorm which, as a logico-transcendental presupposition for 
cognizing legal reality, is comparable to the Kantian categories, 206  making possible the 
constituting of experience in the first place. Like these categories, the Grundnorm shapes the 
sensory material, thereby condensing it into the unity of the object of cognition and making it 
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accessible to the observing and experiencing subject. By providing for the ‘Ought’ of legal 
norms and hence their validity, the basic norm allows the jurist to interpret acts of will as legal 
acts, whilst the basic norm in itself must be presupposed.207 The reason for this is and remains 
Hume’s law, i.e. that legal norms, as normative entities, can logically only be derived from 
other norms, not from facts.208 
Consequently, by strictly distinguishing between the ‘Is’ of the empirical and the ‘Ought’ 
of the normative world, the Pure Theory of Law accomplishes three goals: first, the stringent 
and consistent differentiation from extra-juridical elements, that is, metaphysics in the shape 
of morality, and brute facts in the form of sociology, politics, and psychology209 – a feat for 
which Hart even lauded Kelsen.210 Second, it thereby aims at the ‘scientification’ of the law 
through a descriptive methodology, thus describing what the law is, and not what it should 
be211 (despite the rather complex dual nature of law as a human-made and hence posited fact 
and a behaviour-regulating normative entity). Lastly, the Pure Theory of Law is accordingly 
able to describe the law as a dynamic and self-creating system on the basis of Merkl’s hierarchy 
of norms, culminating in the Grundnorm in order to avoid an infinite regress, according to 
which one can ascertain whether a certain legal norm is a member of a given legal order or not, 
entailing that non-members are to be presumed invalid. In a logically clear manner, it explains 
how it is possible to cognize both the creation and the change of the law on the basis of the 
chains of delegation and derogation in conformity with the duality of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’. 
The last substantial merit to be mentioned and repeated here is the Pure Theory’s 
potential to be extrapolated beyond the boundaries of national law.212 If we assume that a legal 
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norm can only be valid if it has been created in full compliance with superior norms within the 
Stufenbau, and also accept international law as proper law, then it necessarily follows that all 
law, both national and international law, form part of one unitary legal order.213 Furthermore, 
it is also evident that legal monism, as an epistemological and logical necessity and in contrast 
to Kelsen’s ‘choice hypothesis’, is only conceivable under the primacy of the international legal 
order, i.e. with a common Grundnorm at the apex of law in its entirety and international law 
sitting at the top of the chain of delegation. Otherwise, if we assume the national legal orders 
to give validity to international norms, the notion of international law would be reduced to a 
mere absurdity, as there would be as many international legal orders as there are States and 
other international legal subjects. Thus, international law necessarily delegates national law 
logically, not historically, through the principle of effectiveness, both enabling States to be 
effective legal orders and constraining them in their powers on the international plane. Hence, 
in such a monist legal order, there can be no difference in source, substance, and subjects of 
these two bodies of law, which also entails that normative conflicts between national and 
international law are not principally irresolvable, as dualism and pluralism claim. 
At the end of the day, and despite considerable criticism by other eminent legal scholars 
such as Hart and Raz, the Pure Theory of Law and its logical offspring legal monism therefore 
have the unquestionable merit of being able to examine the structure of the law in a way that 
enables jurists to comprehend the legal material and to eventually put it into practice.214 Critics 
might argue that legal theory does not yield any immediate benefits, but it is nonetheless all 
the more able to contribute indirectly to the understanding of the law. And in this vein, 
particularly the Pure Theory of Law has been described as being able to foster analytical 
thinking and problem-solving and to thereby support lawyers in solving concrete legal 
problems on the basis of a certain underlying logical standard.215 
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